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The co-optation of the techniques and language of Alternative Dispute Resolution: A 
critical assessment of developments in the UK 
Introduction: 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) is a consensual process where the parties agree to come to 
a solution, which means that autonomy is a central characteristic of this category of dispute 
resolution processes1 7LGZHOO LGHQWLILHV WKDW ³PHGLDWLRQ LV SUHGLFDWHG XSRQ PHGLDWLRQ¶V
flexibility informality and consensuality opening up the full dimension of the problem facing the 
parties. Parties come to mediation because it is flexible and thus convenient. Mediation is used 
EHFDXVHLWLVQRWDGYHUVDULDOEXWUDWKHUVHHNVWRVDWLVI\WKHQHHGVRIWKHSUHVHQWLQJSDUWLHV´2. The 
very nature of mediation and other ADR processes is that it is based upon a consensual process, 
which is outside of the judicial system3. The problem with co-optation is that it is judicialising 
ADR processes through avenues such as mandatory mediation or adjunctive adjudication 
processes4. The implication of this is that there is a framework in place that is no longer 
consensual in nature; rather, it is merely an extension of the coercive power of the judicial 
system. In the UK, there is arguably a system of co-optation through Civil Procedure Rules 
(CPR) and Family Procedure Rules (FPR), because instead of promoting consensual mediation 
and ADR processes they are coercing individuals to comply with an obligation to engage in 
ADR prior to entering the courts. Thus, this paper is going to examine the content of the CPR 
and FPR to determine whether there is a process of cooptation is occurring within English law.  
The Nature of ADR Processes: 
Prior to engaging with the CPR and FPR, it is necessary to identify the key characteristics of 
ADR. The primary characteristic of ADR is consensuality (i.e. the parties have to agree to 
engage in the ADR process)5.  For example, within mediation it is envisaged that there will be a 
transformative process, in order to ensure that the parties come to a workable solution that 
maintains an ongoing relationship6. However, mediation has been identified as an effective and 
flexible system that can reduce the pressure on national court systems7. The result of this is that 
QDWLRQDO OHJLVODWXUHV DUH GHYHORSLQJ UXOHV WKDW ³SURPRWH´ RU ³UHTXLUH´ DQ $'5 SURFHVV WR EH
engaged with, which can be identified as a form of coercion. There are arguments that the 
promise of empowerment and independence do not exist within ADR, because there is generally 
some form of coercive third party (i.e. mediator, adjudicator, legal counsel)8. This means that 
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there will be little difference if there was a required mediation process, because it debunks the 
myth of a truly consensual process9.   
The problem that arises is that there is a fundamental failure to fully consider the actual nature of 
mediation and other ADR processes when it is treated as a coercive process, because there is a 
more complex nature than just the choice to use ADR (i.e. when the parties are engaged in the 
ADR process there is a right for them to determine how the process is conducted and whether an 
amicable solution is present or enforcement of an award10). These factors highlight that ADR is a 
transformative process, which requires consensuality at different levels. Thus, it is necessary to 
ensure that there is a framework in place that enables the transformative nature of ADR to be 
promoted.  
Baruch Busch and Folger identify that 
³7UDQVIRUPDWLYH PHGLDWRUV DOORZ DQG WUXVW SHRSOH WR ILQG WKHLU RZQ ZD\ WKURXJK WKH
conflict ± and even more important²find themselves and each other, discovering and 
UHYHDOLQJWKHVWUHQJWKDQGXQGHUVWDQGLQJZLWKLQWKHPVHOYHV´11. 
To create this understanding there cannot be a judicial based process, because this increases the 
level of coercion and undermines the purpose of ADR12. The question that arises is whether 
promotion of mediation or ADR can be treated as coercion13. The concept of co-optation can be 
more closely related to a mandatory process, but are the CPR and FPR in English law just as 
coeUFLYHZKHQWKH\DWWHPSWWR³SHUVXDGH´LQGLYLGXDOVWRHQJDJHZLWKDQ$'5SURFHVV 
Persuading individuals to engage in ADR processes through the judicial process can be deemed 
as co-optation, because the choice of the individual to engage in ADR will be undermined if 
there is some form of legal sanction if s/he fails to do so14. The trend to judicialisation of ADR 
SURFHVVHV KDV EHHQ LGHQWLILHG E\ 5\DQ $V 5\DQ DUJXHV WKH FRPSHOOLQJ RI $'5 WKURXJK ³the 
increasing judicialization of ADR represents its co-optation. However, in the context of 
judicially mandated ADR, the state's involvement argues strongly for - if not compels - 
SULRULWL]LQJ WKHSURWHFWLRQRIFRQVWLWXWLRQDO ULJKWV´15. The important factor highlighted is that if 
there is co-optation then there has to be increased safeguards put into place (i.e. 
constitutional/human rights associated with due process). With the increased protections then the 
co-optation will be minimalized, although inevitably present16. Therefore, this paper will now 
turn to an examination of the potential co-optation of ADR processes and then move onto 
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whether there are sufficient protections in place to prevent unfair coercion (i.e. human 
rights/constitutional processes). The focus of this discussion will be mediation, because it is the 
form of ADR where judicialisation is occurring in the UK. 
The Promotion of Mediation: 
It has been identified that mediation is a transformative process, which is why it has been the 
focus of the CPR and FPR. For example, in family law mediation has been seen as the most 
effective process to engage in an amenable process between the parties17. The Norgrove 
Report18 states: 
´2XU DLP LVD VXSSRUWLYH FOHDU SURFHVV IRU SULYDWH ODZ FDVHV WKDW SURPRWHV
joint parental responsibility at all stages, provides information, manages 
expectations and that helps people to understand the costs they face. The 
emphasis throughout should be on enabling people to resolve their disputes 
VDIHO\RXWVLGHFRXUWZKHQHYHUSRVVLEOHµ19. 
The implication is that if there is a family dispute where there are children then 
there has to be an ongoing relationship20. The use of the mediator and additional 
facilitators is important to ensure that the voice of the children is respected within 
the ADR process, which can be lost within the judicial framework21. The rationale is 
that through mediation there can be a better framework developed to create an 
ongoing amicable process, as opposed to the judicial system that is adversarial in 
nature22. Thus, the ADR process (especially mediation) is seen as a better 
framework to protect vulnerable persons (as long as there is a specially trained 
mediator)23.  
Mediation is not only promoted in the family sphere. Rather, EU Mediation 
Directive (Directive 2008 /52/EC) provides mediation should be used to settle cross 
border civil disputes24. Nonetheless, this system has been criticised as being quasi-
mandatory, which means that it can undermine the consensuality of the mediation 
process25. The text of the Mediation Directive does not use absolutist language, 
which can be seen in the text of Article 4(1): 
´0HPEHU 6WDWHV VKDOO HQFRXUDJH E\ DQ\ PHDQV ZKLFK WKH\ FRQVLGHU
appropriate, the development of, and adherence to, voluntary codes of 
conduct by mediators and organisations providing mediation services, as well 
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74(4), 395 
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as other effective quality control mechanisms concerning the provision of 
PHGLDWLRQVHUYLFHµ26. 
The obligation of the state is the promotion of medication and not the enforcement 
of mediation. As Article 4(1) provides, there must be promotion of quality and 
appropriate mediation processes to enable an efficient and cost effective regime27.  
Quality and Appropriate Mediation: 
The fact that the Mediation Directive indicates that there has to be a quality 
process highlights that mediation should only be required/promoted when it is 
appropriate to the circumstances of the dispute28. The question is whether this 
balance is being promoted within English law because the Norgrove Report states: 
´,W VKRXOG EHFRPH WKH QRUP WKDW ZKHUH SDUHQWV QHHG DGGLWLRQDO VXSSRUW WR 
resolve disputes they would first attempt mediation or another dispute 
UHVROXWLRQVHUYLFHµ29. 
The inference is that there is a framework in place that is promoting mediation, but 
in such a way that there is a high degree of coercion (i.e. supporting the argument of 
cooptation). However, this would be incorrect to assume because the English Family 
Procedures Rules 2010 (FPR 2010) both support the principles that if mediation or 
ADR processes are engaged then the parties have to agree (and no sanctions will be 
imposed for reasonable rejection)30.  
Rule 3.2 of the FPR 2010 requires that the courts examine whether the ADR 
process is more appropriate than use of judicial processes. This is supported by Rule 
3.3 FPR 2010, which requires the courts to consider whether: (i) dispute resolution 
is appropriate in the given context31; (ii) there has been fair and proper information 
given in regards to the ADR process32; and (iii) the parties agree33. Within the 
family law context there has to be examination of the context in detail, because if 
there is domestic abuse or a vulnerable child then there will be enhanced harm to 
the child34 (or the party that has been subjected to domestic violence).  
$UWLFOH  RI WKH 0HGLDWLRQ 'LUHFWLYH LGHQWLILHV WKDW ´0HPEHU 6WDWHV VKDOO
encourage the initial and further training of mediators in order to ensure that the 
mediation is conducted in an effective, impartial and competent way in relation to WKH SDUWLHVµ. This principle highlights that it is necessary for there to be quality 
mediation, which is paramount to ensure that there is not promotion of a process 
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that may undermine justice because the circumstances belie any chance of 
consensuality due to the power relations that are involved. It is paramount to HQVXUH WKDW PHGLDWLRQ UHWDLQV WKH FHQWUDO FKDUDFWHULVWLF RI D ´peace-seeking, 
WUDQVIRUPDWLYH FRQIOLFW UHVROYLQJ DQG KXPDQ SUREOHP VROYLQJµ35 process. 
Nonetheless, there is an argument that if co-optation is to be the norm then it 
should not matter whether the parties agree or not. 
The Commercial Realm: 
The interaction between court promoted ADR and the judicial process is more 
developed within the area of commercial law, because there is a greater deal of 
complexity due to the interaction between promoted ADR and chosen ADR. There 
are some areas where it has been recognised that there has to be specialist training 
(such as housing law) due to the presence of a weaker party (i.e. the tenant and 
landlord; consumer and vendor)36. The power imbalance may create a situation 
where any co-opted mediation would be unfair. In Halsey v Milton Keynes NHS37 
and Dunnett v Railtrack38 such power imbalances were examined within the context 
of ADR processes. In the Dunnet Case the parties were a private individual and 
Railtrack where the former was willing to mediate, but the latter party did not, 
Railtrack won the case and made a claim for costs, the courts refused because 
Railtrack unreasonably refused to mediate (a better option in the case). The 
implication is that the judiciary can promote mediation through sanctions for failing 
to engage in the process, even if it is in contradiction of the consensuality of the 
mediation process39.  
Halsey v Milton Keynes NHS also concerned a private individual and a large 
organisation (i.e. part of the NHS) where the large organisation refused to mediate. 
The private individual lost who tried to avoid costs based upon Dunnett v Railtrack, 
but in this case the court refused, because there was not unreasonable refusal. The 
implication is that there is still a measure of choice within the mediation process, 
which means that there is minimized co-optation (i.e. the FPR/CPR prefer 
mediation, but there will be no sanctions when reasonably refused). Thus, this 
counters the argument that mediation or ADR will be mandated. One route that 
may be taken is to have legal professionals consider whether it is relevant. As 
Dyson LJ in Burchell v Bullard40 held: 
´$OO PHPEHUV RI WKH OHJDO SURIHVVLRQ ZKR FRQGXFW litigation should now 
routinely consider with their clients whether their disputes are suitable for 
$'5µ 
                                                          
35 G Genn H., Judging Civil Justice (CUP 2010) , 81 
36 $UGHQ$³$3OHDIRUD+RXVLQJ0HGLDWLRQ6HUYLFH´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37 Halsey v Milton Keynes NHS [2004] EWCA 3006 Civ 576 
38 Dunnett v Railtrack [2002] EWCA Civ 302 
39 Fisher, R., Patton, B. and Ury, W Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreements without giving in, (Random 
House, 1991),  23 
40 Burchell v Bullard [2005] EWCA Civ 358 
This means that if the legal professional can provide evidence in the given 
circumstances that the mediation would be inappropriate then the courts will not 
impose cost sanctions. In other words, the courts have to assess the suitability of 
the mediation /ADR process to the particular dispute41. The main factor that the 
court will determine is whether in the given circumstances there is a chance of 
success42. Nonetheless, there is a presumption that when there are commercial 
parties with equal power that some form of mediation has been engaged with before 
using litigation43.  
Why Cooptation in the Commercial Realm: 
The rationale for supporting judicial and legislative recommendations of using 
mediation and ADR processes is that if offers a more efficient and cost effective 
system for the parties (and the courts are not clogged up with cases that could have 
been resolved otherwise)44. The reason for mediation and ADR processes being 
promoted in the commercial realm has been clearly espoused in Aird v Prime 
Meridian Ltd45 ZKHUH LW ZDV KHOG WKDW PHGLDWLRQ LV ´D IRUP RI QHXWUDOO\ DVVLVWHGQHJRWLDWLRQµ46. In this form of negotiation there is greater independence for the 
SDUWLHVEHFDXVHWKHSURFHVV´QHHGQRWQHFHVVDULO\EHEDVHGRQWKHXQGHUO\LQJOHJDO
rights or obligations of the parties. Instead, the parties, with the assistance of the 
mediator, can reach a solution which is tailored to their real needs and interestVµ47. 
The inference is that mediation (and ADR processes) will be more capable of 
supporting the interests of the parties and coming to an amicable solution than 
objective and abstract judicial determination. Thus, this gives rise to the principle 
of co-optation within the CPR. 
The primary reason for co-optation is to enable the courts to deal with cases justly48, 
which is best achieved through limiting the burden of cases that reach the judicial 
system. This is supported by r. 1.1(2) CPR 1998, which provides that alternative 
processes should be used when practical. The determination of practicality is based 
upon (a) equality; (b) saving expense; (c) proportionality in respect to the value of 
the claim, the importance of the case, complexity of the issues; and the financial 
SRVLWLRQRIHDFKSDUW\GDVVXUDQFHWKDWWKHFDVHLV´GHDOWZLWKH[SHGLWLRXVO\DQG
fairly; and (e) allotting to it an appropriate share of the court's resources, while 
WDNLQJLQWRDFFRXQWWKHQHHGWRDOORWUHVRXUFHVWRRWKHUFDVHVµ49. These factors will 
be examined by the courts, in order to promote mediation/ADR. However, it cannot 
force such processes on the parties. Rather, it may merely indicate that there may 
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42 PGF II SA v OMFS [2013] EWCA Civ 1288 
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46 ibid at 5 
47 ibid at 5 
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be negative cost implications for the failure to consider a more appropriate 
alternative to the judicial process50.  
The Limits of Cooptation in the Common Law: 
There is a fundamental right for the parties to choose how they will access justice, 
in order to resolve a dispute51. This is supported by the case of Weissfisch v Julius52 
where it was held that it is not possible for the courts to mandate ADR. Rather, it 
can only assess whether that have been any ´HIIRUWVPDGHLIDQ\EHIRUHDQGGXULQJ
WKH 3URFHHGLQJV DQ RUGHU WR WU\ DQG UHVROYH WKH GLVSXWHµ53 to determine whether 
there should be negative cost implications. A mere refusal will not give rise to 
negative cost implications; rather the court has to determine whether the refusal is 
reasonable or not54. The application of negative cost implications is not considered 
to be a breach of consensuality or due process, because it is not an additional 
sanction; rather, it is a discretionary determination of how court costs will be 
divided55.   
Hickman v Blake Lapthorn and Another56 held that 
´A party cannot be ordered to submit to mediation as that would be contrary 
WR$UWLFOHRIWKH(XURSHDQ&RQYHQWLRQRQ+XPDQ5LJKWV>DQG@«$SDUW\
V
reasonable belief that he has a strong case is relevant to the reasonableness 
RIKLVUHIXVDOµ57. 
The application of this case confirms the principle of consensuality where 
mandating mediation or ADR would be a breach of human rights (i.e. the process 
would be deemed unconstitutional because there is a lack of due process). 
Nonetheless, this does not prevent the promotion of ADR, which can include 
QHJDWLYHFRVWLPSOLFDWLRQVIRUZDVWLQJWKHFRXUW·VWLPH2QHFRXOGDUJXHWKDWWKLVLV
a case of mandated ADR; however, as long as the party shows that the decision not 
to engage in an ADR process is reasonable there will be no cost sanctions. 
Therefore, the main factor that the English CPR rules have developed is balance, in 
order to promote more individuals (when appropriate) to engage with ADR 
processes. This is still a form of co-optation, but there are safeguards and limits to 
protect the parties that are engaging in the process.   
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